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Introduction
After the seminal paper by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , the literature on supply functions has been growing in several directions. This is no surprise, because supply function competition represents an interesting option when modelling oligopolistic interaction. However, the complexity of the Klemperer and Meyer (1989) setting has stimulated approaches designed to make their original model more tractable.
More precisely, we have witnessed a special focus on linear supply functions. One of the models proposed in this vein is in Menezes and Quiggin (2012) , where …rms choose the intercept of their linear supply functions, while the slope is treated as a parameter, in such a way that, if the slope is nil, the equilibrium outcome replicates Cournot, whereas if the slope is in…nitely high, it replicates Bertrand or perfect competition.
Menezes and Quiggin's (2012) formulation, however, allows one to treat also the slope as a strategic variable. This is what we do in this paper. We show that the resulting …rst order conditions in the extended strategy space formed by both intercepts and slopes are not linearly independent and the Nash equilibrium generated by choosing either one is the same.
We set up the model in section 2. Section 3 contains our results, and section 4 concludes by underlying some extensions.
The model
Consider an oligopoly formed by n identical …rms selling a homogeneous good whose market demand function is p = a Q; where p is market price, a > 0 is a parameter measuring market size (which is normalised to one in Menezes and Quiggin (2012)) and industry output Q = P n i=1 q i is the sum of all individual outputs q i . Firm i's cost function is C i = cq i where parameter c 2 (0; a). Menezes and Quiggin (2012) specify the individual …rm's supply function as q i = i c=n + (p c) ; where intercept i > 0 is the strategic variable, while slope 0 is a parameter. It is worth noting that this supply function is increasing in the mark-up; the intercept is normalised the characterisation of equilibrium.
In view of Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006), where the supply function is q i = i p and the slope is the strategic variable, we extend Menezes and Quiggin's (2012) approach by stipulating that the supply function is as follows:
where both the intercept i > 0 and the slope i 0 are strategic variables.
Solving the ex ante market-clearing condition, we get
so that the individual pro…t function is
Results 
where 1 + P n i=1 i and 1 + P j6 =i j . Looking at the system (4-5), it appears that
which implies the following:
Lemma 1 If the strategy space of the game in supply functions includes both the slope and the intercept of each …rm's supply, strategic variables are not linearly independent.
The above Lemma immediately implies a relevant consequence:
Proposition 2 Under linear supply competition, the Nash equilibrium is independent of the combination of intercepts and slopes chosen by …rms.
That is to say, the Nash equilibrium of this game can be equivalently obtained by (i) posing i = in (4) and then solving for i or (ii) posing i = in (5) and then solving for i . This entails that …rm i may not even know (and in fact, doesn't care to know) whether any rival …rm j is using (4) or (5).
It is a matter of simple algebra to show that the two methods indeed lead to the same outcome. Procedure (i) yields the same Nash equilibrium solution as in Menezes and Quiggin (2012, eq. (5), p. 713):
= c (1 + n ) + an [1 + (n 2)] n [n + 1 + n (n 1)]
Procedure (ii) yields = c + n [a (n + 1)] n [n (n 1) a (n 2) c]
and then it is easily veri…ed that and are invertible, with = ( ) 1 .
Using , the equilibrium price p is as in Menezes and Quiggin (2012, eq.
(6), p. 173), with
reproducing the special cases of Cournot and Bertrand (or perfect competition), respectively. If one uses instead ; the resulting price is p = c + n (n 1) a (n 2) 2 (10) with p = a + cn n + 1 at = an + c n (n + 1) = j =0 (11) and p = c at = a (n 2) + c n (n 1) = lim
Then, the equivalence between the two above procedures is complete.
Extensions
The result stated in Proposition 1 extends to a more general setup in which the cost function includes a quadratic component, becoming
as in Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006). 1 In this case, one may simply rewrite the individual supply function as
and then proceed as above.
Moreover, because of the lack of linear independence between (4) and (5), it can also be shown that exactly the same equilibrium outcome arises if the game takes a two-stage structure in which the …rst stage takes place in the -space and the second stage in the -space (or the opposite).
Finally, one may wonder about the speci…c normalisation adopted by Menezes and Quiggin (2012) . It can be easily shown that our result does not depend on it, by reconstructing the foregoing argument under the assumption that the supply function is written as q i = i + i p.
